Illustration: Lu Ting/GT

Chinese PremierLi Keqiangsaid in his first annual government work report Wednesday that China's GDP growth target for 2014 will be 7.5 percent, the same target set by the government in 2013 and 2012.

Some experts question whether China can transform its economic growth structure and implement much-needed reforms while still maintaining a 7.5-percent growth pace. If China continues to spur the economy toward this goal, many argue that pre-existing problems such as mounting government debt loads and industrial overcapacity will only get worse.

But as Premier Li explained, it's necessary to keep China's growth target where it is. This target is meant to give officials at all levels of the government something to strive for. It is also meant to serve as a reminder to ordinary Chinese people that the country is capable of achieving steady growth, even in the midst of sweeping reforms like those mentioned in documents which surfaced after November's Third Plenary Session of the 18th Communist Party of China Central Committee.

Meanwhile, top government leaders have emphasized the importance of stabilizing employment growth and consumer inflation over the year ahead. Reforms can inject new vitality and spur domestic demand while also boosting economic development. But China needs to focus on achieving these goals in a way that's balanced.

This year, the government will not aim for an expansion in GDP growth, as it has done in years gone by. This is reasonable considering the pervasive belief that China's past reliance on investment planted the seeds for a host of problems: not least of which being worsening air quality, worryingly high levels of local debt and heavy industrial overcapacity. The focus now is on quality over quantity, as evidenced not only by repeated statements from China's central leadership but also revamped performance criteria within the cadre review system. These new standards will have a deep impact on regional economic development as local officials will now have to take responsibility for their decisions even after leaving their posts.

Of course, Li mentioned several specific measures to strike at China's economic problems. For example, the government plans to cut 27 million tons of outdated steel capacity, 42 million tons of cement capacity and 35 million standard containers of plate glass.

The Chinese government is clearly eager to meet its goals on the industrial front, especially with so many other sources of potential risk still looming over the country's economy as a whole. Conditions in the property market, for example, are becoming increasingly unstable in the view of many experts. In first-tier cities, housing prices continue to hit ever loftier heights, while in third- and fourth-tier cities many are concerned about the possibility of collapsing prices. Needless to say, this split presents numerous dilemmas related to social stability and economic growth which the government is undoubtedly keen to resolve. In my opinion, authorities should increase the building of public housing as a way to satisfy unmet demand and to soak up cement, steel and other industrial commodities.

But problems persist beyond the real estate market. The real economy is still strapped for funds as banks continue to reserve the bulk of their credit for large, State-owned enterprises. While innovation booms in areas like Internet finance may help iron out some of the long-standing kinks in China's financial chain, these burgeoning areas also present challenges for regulators looking to mitigate market risk.

The government's determination to alter China's existing economic order is undeniable. The next two to three years will be crucial for leaders as they implement needed reforms. Although we can expect a certain amount of displacement from the government's policy maneuvers, authorities should be able to achieve their targets for 2014 if they focus on balanced growth.

The article was compiled by Global Times reporter Yu Xi based on an interview with Su Peike, chief research fellow at Public Policy Research Center of University of International Business and Economics.